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APPEAL-DIv IsON OF JUDGEs-AFRMANCE.-CLAR1C V. WABASH RY. Co.,
xO9 N. W. 3o9 (IowA).-Held, that on appeal, if the State Supreme Court is
equally divided, the ruling of the lower court is affirmed by operation of law.
The judgment will be affirmed or exceptions over-ruled when the Appel-
late Court is divided in opinion, Etting v. United States Bank, 24 U. S. 59;
Clark v. Kean, i Del. Ch. 144; otherwise the majority opinion rules, Beau-
lieu v. Furst, 2 La. Ann. 46; and it matters not if such is reached by differ-
ent reasoning. Oakley v. Aspinwall, 8 N. Y. Sup. i It follows that
when the Court of Appeals is equally divided in opinion as to part of the
decree appealed from, it must be affirmed as to so much; and if they concur
or a majority of them concur, that there is eror in the residue, so much of it
must be reversed. Commonwealth v. Beaumarchais, 3 Call. 122 (Va.). But
in the National Supreme Court, if on a constitutional question, a majority is
required to pronounce a judgment, Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank, 33 U.
S. 118; as to jurisdiction, if equal division, the jurisdiction is sustained and
the case is decided on its merits. State v. Hays, 30 W. Va. 1o7; contra, if in
U. S. Supreme Court, Coleman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., Fed. Cas., No.
2983. When one judge is disqualified or cannot sit in a cause, and the other
two are divided, the decision below is affirmed, Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Gentrey,
13 U. S. App. 5,31; contra, no judgment can be rendered, Bowman v. Flower,
5 Mart. (La.) 407. But when such opinion is divided and judgment affirmed,
the court are not obliged by statutes to file their opinions as in other cases,
Fraser v. Whilley, 2 Fla. 116; nor does it settle the law, Bridge v. Johnson,
5 Vend. (N. Y.) 342, Durrett v. Rucker, 36 Ga. 272; and a bill in equity will
be dismissed, Waddle v. U. S. Bank, 2 Ohio 336.
CONTRACTs-ABAND)ONMENT-PART PERFORMANCE.-CLEVELAND, C. C. &
ST. L. RY. Co. v. ScoTT, 79 NORTHEASTERN, 226 (IND.).-Held, that a recovery
may be had for a part performance of an entire contract, though there be no
cause or excuse for its abandonment, if the part performed is beneficial to the
defendant.
If the servant, without legal excuse, abandon the employment before
full performance of an entire contract, he cannot recover anything for-
his services upon the contract, Start v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; for under an
entire contract, full performance is a condition precedent to the right of
recovery thereon, Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. Io4; neither can he recover on
an implied contract, Laurence v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 131; because the special
contract governs the rights of the parties in respect to what has been done
under it and excludes any implied contract, Hansell v. Erickson, 28 Ill. 257.
The same applies to the contractor in the same circumstances. Olmstead
v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528; Peterson v. Maher, 46 Minn. 468; Diefenback v. Stark,
56 Wis. 462. Although the rule very generally prevails that one guilty of a
wilful breach of an entire or special, but not general contract, is without
remedy for the recovery for a part performance, yet it is not universal. The
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pioneer case, Britton v. Turner, 6 N. IL 481, allowed a recovery upon a quan-
tum meruit to the extent of benefits received, but that recovery, if any, was
based at the contract price with deduction for what it would cost to procure
a completion and of any damages sustained by reason of the breach and this
case has since been followed by a very few states, Pixler v. Nichols, 8 Iowa
io6; Wheatly v. Miscal, 5 Ind. I1[2; Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. io7. Those
cases rested on two reasons: First, that a plaintiff should be allowed to
recover, notwithstanding a wilful breach, for the reason that when he was
sued by the defendant, the defendant might not be able to recover more than
nominal damages, and in such a case, to refuse the plaintiff a right of action,
would be to give substantial damages to the defendant Second, that the
understanding of the community, in such a case, is that a laborer shall receive
compensation for the services actually rendered by him, but this understand-
ing rests not on the contract itself but only upon the obligation imposed by
law. Parcell v. McCumber, ii Neb. 2o9; Chambler v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98;
Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex. 147.
CONTRAcrS-MASTER Am SERvAT--WoNGn L DiscHARG-DANmL v.
MANHATTAN Lim INS. Co., IO2 N. Y. Susp. 27. A contract of employment
stipulated that either party might terminate it by a notice of thirty days.
Thereafter, the contract was extended for a year from a specified date.
Similar renewals were subsequently made, the last renewal extending the
contract for a year after a specified date. Held, that the master was liable
for discharging the employee before the expiration of the year. Jenks, J.,
dissenting.
A new contract may abrogate an earlier one, either expressly or by impli-
cation. Evans -v_ acobitz, 67 Kan. 249; Sutton v. Griebel, 118 Ia. 78. To
effect discharge by implication, however, the new contract must be dearly
inconsistent with the earlier contract. Drown v. Forrest, 63 Vt 557; Pease v.
McQuillin, iSo Mass. 135. If the later contract covers the same subject and
has the same scope, but is wholly or partially inconsistent therewith, it abro-
gates the earlier contract in toto. Tuggles v. Callison, 143 Mo. 527; Spreckel
v. Bander, 30 Or. 577. But if the subject-matter is only in part the same, the
latter contract supersedes and abrogates, only in so far as it is inconsistent
with the earlier one. Alferitz v. Ingalls, 83 Fed. 964; Bray v. Loomer, 61
Conn. 456. A modification which merely extends the time for performance,
leaves the remaining provisions in full force. Underwood v. Wolf, 131 Ill.
425. The minority opinion in this case is supported in Blondel v. Le Ves-
conte, 41 Minn. 35, holding that after a contract of service for no definite
period had been partly performed, a subsequent written agreement fixing a
definite term, embodies the terms of the prior contract
CORPORATIONS-TRANSFER OF ASSETS-VALIDrTY AS TO CREDITOR.-WARD
v. CITY TRUST Co. OF NEW YORK, Io2 N. Y. SuPP. 5o. A trust company
loaned money to the owners of the capital stock of a corporation, taking their
note therefor, with the stock as security. Thereafter, the control of the
corporation affairs was given to one of the stockholders who, in the name
of the corporation, as president and general manager, indorsed a draft drawn
to the order of the corporation, to the trust company who accepted this as
payment of the loan and surrendered the note and stock. Held, that the title
of the trust company to the draft could not be attacked on the ground that
the payment thereof rendered the corporation insolvent, where the company
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had no information, leading it to believe that the corporation was thereby
made insolvent. Scott and McLaughlin, J.J., dissenting.
The assets of a corporation are a trust fund for the payment of its debts
upon which the creditors have an equitable lien both as against stockholders.
and all transferees, except those purchasing in good faith for value. Brum
v. Ins. Co., 6 Fed. 143; San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Bee, 48 Cal. 398. This.
doctrine obtains whether a corporation is solvent or insolvent. Union Nat.
Bank v. Douglas, i McCrary 86. In England, the so-called "trust fund" doc-
trine is not applied in respect to business corporations. In re Wincham
Shipbuilding Co., 9 Ch. Div. 322. But a person who pays value for negotiable
paper is to be regarded as rightful holder unless he has been guilty of
actual bad faith and he is not bound to make inquiries as to defects in the
title thereof. Johnson v. Way, 27 Ohio St 374; Spooner v. Holmes, io2
Mass. 503. There are minority dicta, however, supporting the dissenting
opinion here, which hold that a corporation note, given for an individual
obligation is not given in the regular course of business, but presumptively is
ultra vires and therefore, one who takes such paper with knowledge that it is
not given for a corporate purpose, can have no claim to the protection
accorded a bona fide holder. McLellan v. Detroit File Works, 56 Mich. 579;
West St. Louis Savings Bank v. Shawnee County Bank, 95 U. S. 557.
CRIMINAL LAw-FoitmER JEoPARDY.-STEmNKUH;ER v. STATE, iog N. W.
"395 (NEB.).-Held, that to constitute a former jeopardy, it must appear that
the defendant was put upon trial before a court having competent jurisdic-
tion upon an indictment or an information sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction, and that the jury was impaneled and sworn, and thus
charged with his deliverance. This privilege, derived from legal guaranty,
was common law, 4 Bl. Comm., 335; and when declared in the American Bill
of Rights, it was held that it applied only to the Federal Courts, United
State v. Gilbert, Fed. Cas., No. 152o4, Cold v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; but the
constitutions of the several states have the same provision, Bishop Crim.
Law, Vol. I, 65o. It applies to felonies and misdemeanors, but not to actions
qui tam; nor to civil or tort actions; nor to any action which does not make
the defendant liable to be restrained from his personal liberty, Brink v. State,
18 Tex. App. 344; State v. Spear, 6 Md. 644. It may be waived by the
defendant, State v. Gurney, 37 Maine I56. In its application, the interpreta-
tion has occasionally been, "That no man shall be tried twice for the same
offence," People v. Goodwin, I8 Johns. 187; but "how can it mean that when
there is a plain difference between a verdict given and the jeopardy of a
verdict? Hazard, peril, danger, jeopardy of a verdict cannot mean a verdict
given." Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577; Bishop Crim. Law, Vol. I, 661;
Cobin v. The State, 6 Ala. 781. Thus it follows that former jeopardy
attaches as soon as a person has once been put upon his trial before a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information, which is suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction and the jury has been charged with his deliver-
ance, and if, afterwards, for any reason, the jury are discharged unneces-
sarily and without his consent, he is entitled to his discharge and cannot be
tried again, Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 29o; State v. Wallers, i6 La. Ann. 400;
Price v. State, Ig Ohio 423. But there can be no former jeopardy when the
acquittal was obtained by fraud, State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54; nor if indict-
ment or information is defective, no matter how far trial has proceeded,
Maxwell Crim. Procedure, 566; Commonwealth v. Peters, 12 Met. 387; nor
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if one juror escape, State v. Hall, 4 Halst. 256; likewise if juryman was
incompetent or not sufficiently sworn, or if the case was tried by a less than
legal jury, Brown v. The State, 5 Eng. 6o7; nor if jury are discharged upon
failure to agree, but contra if the discharge before disagreement is without
defendant's consent, United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; nor proceedings
before a grand jury, State v. Whipple, 57 Vt 637; nor increased penalties for
subsequent offences, Kelley v. People, 115 Ill. 583; nor a plea of guilty
extorted by duress and judgment entered upon it, Sanders v. State, 4 Crim.
Law Mag. 359; nor pendency of other indictments for the same charge, Bailey
v. State, ix Tex. App. i4o.
DIVORCE-AcTioN-STATE CouT-JuusDicTIoN-Domici -STAZ EX
Rl ALDRACH v. MoRsE, 87 PAC. 705 (UTAH.)-Held, that where a husband
and wife were married and resided in Utah, where the husband abandoned the
wife, the matrimonial domicile was in that state, which was all that was
essential to confer jurisdiction to decree a divorce, though the husband
could not be personally served there.
This case is interesting as following the much discussed case of Had-
dock v. Haddock, 2oi U. S. 562. The domicile of the husband for all practi-
cal purposes is the domicile of the wife. Greene v. Greene, 28 Mass. 41o.
But for the purpose of bringing a suit, when the husband's conduct is cause
for the same, she may acquire a domicile distinct from his. Ditson v. Dit-
son, 4 R. I. 87. The desertion of the husband for a time sufficient to give the
wife a cause for divorce, entitles her to sue in the former domicile of the-
husband. Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. I8. So where the actual residence of
the wife is in one state, but her domicile in another, an act of the husband,
cause for divorce, will make the former her domicile, Bowman v. Bowman,
24 IlL App. 165. By acquiring a foreign residence the wife does not.lose the
right to sue in the state of the husband's domicile, Sewall v. Sewall, i=a Mass.
156. There may be a separate domicile when the husband and wife are liv-
ing apart under judicial separation, or when the husband has been guilty of
misconduct. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217; which overcomes the presumption
that the domicile of the husband is that of the wife, Harteau v. Harteau, 14
Pick. i8I; and the wife may maintain a suit in the state where they were last
domiciled, B urtis v. Burtis, 161 Mass. 5o8.
EMEZZLEMENT-INDIcTmENT--CHARAmER IN wHIcH PRoumrTy wAs
REcEIVED-ALEGATIoN-SUFFICIENCY.-STORMS V. STATE, 98 S. W. 678
(A..).--Held, on a trial for embezzlement, evidence of similar transac-
tions by accused, before and after transaction relied on, is admissible on the
question of his intent.
In a prosecution of a clerk, in a Circuit Court for converting to his own
use solicitor's fees in certain cases, proof of other acts of embezzlement of
similar character is admissible to show guilty knowledge. Stanley v. State,
88 Ala. 154. In a prosecution for embezzlement previous acts of embezzle-
ment similar to the one charged may be shown as evidence of guilty knowl-
edge. Same v. Neyce, 88 Cal. 393. On a trial for embezzlement testimony
as to transactions in the year following, and similar in character to those
charged, are competent evidence to show guilty knowledge on the part of the
defendant. People v. DeGraff, 6 N. Y. 412.
EvmDca--OPMiONS OF NoN-ExPERTs.-DAvis v. SHORT LiNE Ry. Co., 88
PAc. 2 (UTA).-Held, that a man's wife, who-had lived with him for
many years, and was in attendance on him during his illness, and was in a
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condition to inform herself of his general physical condition as it was before
and after he was injured, may testify to his good or poor health, and as to his
suffering pains or being free from them.
A non-expert witness may give an opinion as to the general health and
physical condition of another, if the facts upon which the opinion is based,
are within his knowledge, and have been first stated. Louisville, N. A. & C.
v. Holsapple, 38 N. E. 137; Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, io2 Ind. 138. A
mother of the injured party, with whom she has been living, may testify
from her observations as to what the physical condition of the party injured
was, before the accident. Sherman v. Village of Oneota, 21 N. Y. Supp. 137.
A wife may testify as to the appearance of her husband's injuries. James
v. Ford, 9 N. Y. Supp. 5o4. Testimony by non-experts of the plaintiff's con-
dition before and after the accident is admissible, such testimony being within
the range of common observation; and the fact that expert witnesses have
given contrary evidence is no ground for excluding it. Winter v. Central Ia.
Ry. Co., 45 N. W. 737.
EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE-COURT RECORD.-WARBURTON V. GOWRE, 79
N. E. 27o (MAsS.).-Held, the court record of a trial, though meager, must
be taken as true, and can neither be enlarged nor diminished by parol evi-
dence.
Parol evidence it inadmissible to vary the terms of a written instrument.
I Greenleaf Ev., Section 275. Judicial proceedings must be proved from
record of court. Lyon v. Bolling, 14 Ala. 753. Except facts connected with
the trial, which were not proper to be incorporated in the record and not
inconsistent with it, may, when relevant, be proved by parol evidence. Tobey
v. Esterely Machine Co., 44 Am. St. Rep. 554 (N. D.). The oral testi-
mony of a magistrate is not admissible to contradict his own record of the
proceedings before him, Henshaw v. Sanil, 114 Mass. 74. Nor can parol evi-
dence be given to vary decree of divorce, Wilson v. Wilson, 45 Cal. 399. The
record of proceedings in bankruptcy, however, is only prima facie evidence
of the facts stated in it and may be varied by parol testimony. Tehley v.
Ban, 16 Pa. i96. A conclusive judgment in one state offered in evidence in
another cannot be varied by parol testimony, Barkman v. Hopkins, ii Ark.
157.
EVIDENCE-PREUMPTIONS--COMMON LAw.-ELLINGTON V. HARRIS, 56
S. E. 134 (GA.) .- Held, there being no evidence as to what was the law of
South Carolina, the presumption is that the common law there prevailed.
The views upon this proposition are by no means uniform. In some
states it is held that in the absence of proof, it will be presumed that the
laws of another state are the same as the laws of the forum. Osborn v.
Blackburn, 78 Wis. 2og. Others hold that the law of another state will be
presumed to be the same as the common law of the state of the forum.
Tilexan v. Wilson, 43 Me. 186. Again, in the absence of evidence, some
courts maintain that no presumption arises that the statute law of the forum
is the same as the law of another state. Dickey v. Bank, 89 Md. 28o. But
where the law of two states has been the same, the repeal of the law in the
state of the forum will not raise a presumption of its repeal in the other.
Ex parte Lafonta, 2 Rob. 495 (La.). A court cannot presume that laws as
to the distribution of intestate property in one state are the same as in
another. Leach v. Pillsbury, 15 N. H. 137. No presumption will be made as
to the law of a foreign state which would work a forfeiture. Way v. Tele-
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graph Co., 83 Ala. 542. The general rule, then, seems to be that when the
courts of a state shall know as a fact, the law of a particular state, such law
must be proved as a fact, and the court will not take judicial notice of it,
but in the absence of proof, will presume it to be the same as the law of the
forum. R. R. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412.
INJUNcrIoN-BoYcoTTING.ALFRED W. BOOTH & BRO. V. BuaaEss, Er AT.,
65 ATL., 226 (N. J.).-Held, that the manufacturer was entitled to an
injunction restraining the officers of the union from directing or inducing by
threats, etc., the employees of the boss carpenters to strike.
Prior to the decision of Leathen v. Quinn, 15 Q. B. 476, decided in igoi
the doctrine laid down in the leading English case of Allen v. Flood, i A. C.
:894, was followed both in the United States and England, viz., that it was not
illegal for one person or combination to persuade a party not to enter into a
contract with another, if his ability or capacity was not impugned. Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R i5 Q. B. D. 476; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal.
578; Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 43o. But a conspiracy to injure a person in
his profession by false statements, as to his character followed by damages is
actionable. Wilder v. McKee, iix Penn. St. 335. It seems to be an undis-
puted rule in most jurisdictions that workmen have the right to organize
themselves in associations for the purpose of having their demands granted
and to strike or quit work in a body upon the refusal of the employer to
accede to their demands. Arthur v. Oakes, ii C. C. A. 209. But to allow a
business to be subjected to the control of an organization, that orders away
its employees and frightens away others that it may seek to employ, is a con-
dition utterly at war with every principal of justice. State v. Charles T.
Stewart, et al., 59 Vt 273. It seems preposterous to deny an individual the
right to carry on a legitimate business, as he sees fit, and the law should
afford ample protection against powerful combinations using coercion and
intimidating his customers. Oxley Stave Co: v. Hopkins, et al., 83 Fed. 912.
The procurement of workmen to quit work, who are employed upon satis-
factory terms, unless the employer accedes to the demands of persons who
he is under no obligation to, is illegal and constitutes a malicious and unlawful
interference in the business of the employer, which is not only actionable, but
a misdemeanor at common law. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna,
3o Fed. 48.
INsuRAxc-ORAL APPLicATioN-WAivL---GLENS FALLs INS. Co. v.
MICHAEL, 79 N. E. 9o5 (IND.).-Held, that where a standard fire policy was
issued on an oral application, without any representations on the part of the
assured as to the extent of his title, insurer thereby waived a clause provid-
ing for forfeiture, in case assured's interest was other than unconditional
and sole ownership in fee.
A covenant in a fire policy, that the application "contains a just, full and
true exposition of all the facts in regard to the condition and value of the
property," is waived by an insurer who issues it solely upon a bare request.
Commonwealth v. Hide & Leather Ins. Co., 12 Mass. 136; Bahringer v.
Empire Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 T. and C. (N. Y.) 61o. This is upon the ground
that an applicant has a right to suppose that the insurer will make proper
inquiries, and that, if he does not, he waives information in regard to them.
Short v. Home Ins. Co., 9o N. Y. 16. But a clause in a fire insurance policy
avoiding the policy if the premises are vacant for a specified period, is not
waived by reason of knowledge on the part of the insurer that they are
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vacant at the time the policy issued. Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Chadwick,
13 Tex. Civ. App. 318; Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tilley, 88 Va. 1o24. There are
many dicta contrary to the case in point, upon the ground that where there
is no written application and no terms have been agreed upon by parol, except
the amount, the insured must be charged with knowledge that the policy he
receives, contains the contract binding upon him. Waller v. Northern Assur.
Co., io Fed. 232; Brown v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 86 Ala. E89; Wierengo
v. Amer. Fire Ins. Co., 98 Mich. 621.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-AcTION BY LANDLORD TO RECoVER PossEssIoN-
DEFENSES.-WALLACE V. OCEAN GROVE CAMP MEETING Ass'N OF METHODIST
EpiscoPAL CHuacH, 148 FED. 672 (N. J.).-Held, a tenant, who repudiates
that relation and claims title adversely to the landlord, cannot defend against
an action by the landlord to recover possession on the ground of the insuffi-
ciency of the notice to terminate the lease.
Where the relation of landlord and tenant is disclaimed by the tenant,
or the tenant repudiates the title of his landlord, neither a demand of posses-
sion or notice to quit is necesary to enable the landlord to maintain an action
for possession of premises. Carger v. Fee, 4o Ind. 572; 39 N. E. 93. A land-
lord is not bcund to give his tenant notice to quit, if the tenant has taken
possession under an adverse title. Williams v. Hensley, i A. K. Marshall x8r.
The notice to quit to which a tenant at sufferance is entitled cannot be
claimed by one who has asserted any title that directly or impliedly nega-
tives the right to put an end to his interest Kunzie v. Wixom, 39 Mich. 384.
In ejectment the defense of adverse possession is inconsistent with a tenancy,
and exempts plaintiff from the necessity of proving a notice to quit. Wolf
v. Holton, 92 Mich. 136; 52 N. W. 459. A tenant at will cannot defend an
action of ejectment by the landlord on the ground that he had no notice to
quit, where the answer expressly denies plaintiff's title, and sets up ownership
in defendant. McCarthy v. Brown, 113 Cal. 15.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DFErT IN PnEmisEs-INuRIEs To OCCuPANTS.-
HATCH ET AL. V. MCCLOUD RvER LUMBER Co., 88 PAC. 355.-Held, occu-
pants of premises under a lease assumed the risk of injury from a wire
extending from an electric light pole without the premises to an anchor about
two feet within the premises which was so located at the time of the lease
and was known to them.
Where the occupants of a terement house are permitted, without objec-
tion, to use the yard, and there is no restriction in the lease against such use,
an easement is thereby created in favor of the tenant, and the landlord is
liable for injuries resulting'from his failure to make the yard safe. Canavan
v. Stayvesant, 27 N. Y. Sup. 413. A nuisance being allowed to remain in the
same position a sufficient length of time without any endeavor on the part of
the defendant by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, to ascertain its
dangerous position; and having let the premises with a nuisance, existing
thereupon bi, is, under the circumstance, liable for injuries sustained by
the tenant, Ahicrn v. Steel, 115 N. Y. 203. In an action for personal injuries,
it appears that in the yard of a tenement house in which apartments were
rented from dafendant to plaintiff's father, a large flat stone stood almost per-
pendicularly against the fence, and had so stood for several months, and at
the time the apartments were let; that while the plaintiff's child was playing
around the F nne, it fell and injured her, it was held that the defendants were
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liable, though they had no actual knowledge of the existence of the stone, or
its dangerous nature. Schmidt v. Cook et al., 33 N. Y. Sup. 624.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DEFEcTm CA-Dunr o INsPECTIoN.-SnANK-
wEnER v. BAuL oan & 0. I. P. Co., 148 FEER. REoRm z95. A railroad
company is not chargeable with negligence which will render it liable for an
injury to an employee caused by the breaking of a defective brake-rod,
where the defect was latent and in a place where it was not discoverable by
such an inspection as is customarily made by well-regulated and prudently
-conducted railroads, which inspection was made and was the only kind which
-was practicable, or which could be made without seriously interfering with
.the operation of trains.
It is the duty of defendant railroad company, receiving a freight car from
another company, to inspect it, and to see that it is reasonably fit for service;
.and, in the event that a freight car is received with a brake-beam in such a
defective condition that defendant's brakeman, whose duty it is to couple the
foreign car with those of defendant, and is injured in his attempt to make
such coupling, and the brakeman has no knowledge of the condition of the
brake-beam, and its condition cannot be readily seen, defendant is liable for
-such injury. Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Barber, 44 Kan. 612, 24
Pac. 969.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INURY TO SERVANT-VICE PRINCPA--TVwNA
T'. KEAHON, Ioi N. Y. Supp. io76. Houghton and Scott, J.J., dissenting.
Held.-One through whom the proprietor of a livery stable conducted it,
and who is the manager and superintendent thereof, and employs help, is the
vice-principal of the master, for whose negligence in failing to instruct a
common laborer how to start an engine, great danger being attendant thereon
.unless it was started properly, the master is liable.
A foreman in a mine, whose duty it was to direct ten or twelve men
what work to do, and take care of mine, but who is subject to the orders of
the pit boss and the superintendent, is the fellow servant and not vice-princi-
,pal of a laborer under his control, who is injured while assisting the foreman
in the execution of his work. What Cheer Coal Co. v. 1ohnson, 56 Fed.
81o; Railroad Co. v. Baugh, i3 Sup. Ct 914. A section boss having charge
of keeping track in order, who hired and discharged his men, but who was
subject to the orders and directions of a track master, to whom it was his
duty to report needed repairs, and to receive from him the necessary tools
:and materials, was a fellow servant of a section hand injured from the defect-
ive condition of a hand car, the defects in which were known to such section
boss, and were suffered to exist through his negligence. Barringer v. Dela-
ware & H. Canal Co., ig Hun. 216. In an action to recover for injuries sus-
•tained while unloading dirt under a foreman who was in charge of the men,
that he was not a vice-principal, but fellow servant, although he had power to
discharge for cause. Schroeder v. Flint and P. M. R. Co., 103 Mich. 2r3; 61
N. W. 663.
NEGLIGENE-DANGEROUS PREmisES-CARE REQUIRED.-GILPALLAN V.
-GERmAN HosPITAL & DISPENSARY m THE CrrY OF NEw YoRK, ioo N. Y.
Supp. 6o. The intestate, employed as plumber by the defendant, attempted
to leave the defendant's premises by means of a ladder and wall, although
the premises were provided with a safe entrance and exit After climbing
-to the top of the wall and as he stepped out on what he supposed to be the
-roof of an ash-lift, he fell into a well sustaining fatal injuries. Held, that as
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the intestate had never been authorized to use this means of exit from the
hospital grounds, the defendant owed him no duty to keep the same safe for
that purpose. Hooker, J., dissenting.
The basis of liability in negligence cases is the violation of some legal
duty to exercise care. Cusick v. Adams, 115 N. Y. 55. Such duty must be
owed to the plaintiff or the action will not lie. Nickerson v. Bridgeport H.
Co., 46 Conn. 24; Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N. J. L. ig. The general
rule is that a landowner is under no obligation to render his premises safe
for any purpose for which he cannot reasonably anticipate that they will be
used. Armstrong v. Medbury, 67 Mich. 25o. A mere license given by the
owners to enter and use the premises, which the licensee has full opportunity
of inspecting and which contain no concealed cause of mischief, throws no
obligation upon the owner to guard the licensee against danger. Sullway v.
Waters, 14 Ir. C. L. 46o. If plaintiff is a licensee and falls into a hole, which
is not concealed except by the darkness of night, the owner of the premises
is not liable for injuries sustained thereby. Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass.
267.
NEGLIGENcE-EvIDENCE To ESTABLISH.-LEONARD V. MIAMI MIN. Co., 148
FED. REP. 827.-Held, that an inference of negligence cannot be based on a
presumption nor on speculation and conjecture.
General rule is that negligence cannot be presumed without any evi-
dence, Lyndsay v. Conn. & P. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 643; Daniel v. Directors,
etc., Met. R. Co., L. R. (5 H. L.) 45. And as law does not impute it, it lies
on party alleging it to prove it, Doyle v. Boston & A. R. R. Co., 145 Mass.
386; O'Connor v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 94 Mo. I5o. Mere fact of an accident's
happening does not amount to evidence sufficient to base an inference of neg-
ligence on, Welfare v. London & B. R. Co., L. R. (4 Q. B.) 698. To the.
general rule as just stated there are two well recognized exceptions, the first
being: when relation of carrier and passenger exists and injury occurs dur-
ing actual transportation, Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534.
But besides these two elements the plaintiff must show that the accident was
caused by some defect in road or some part of the apparatus employed in
operating it, Wall v. Livezay, 6 Col. 465; Christie v. Griggs, 2 Campbell's Rep.
79. The second exception being: when an injury arises from some condi-
tion or event which is in its very nature so obviously destructive of safety of
person or property as to admit of no other inference save negligence on
part of person in control of such agency, such acts come within the principle
of res ipsa loquitur, Kearney v. London & B. R. Co., L. R. (6 Q. B.) 761;
Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567.
PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT-EQUIVALENTs.-UNIvERSAL BRUSH Co. v.
SONN, nr AL, 146 FED. 517 (N. Y.).-Held, that the substantial equivalent of
a patented device or means which performs the same function does not avoid
an infringement because it may perform an additional function.
The courts and text writers are very reluctant about defining the term
invention, lest it should breed injustice. However, it must be new, useful
and comply with all legal formalities. Cooley on Torts, second edition, page
414. Novelty is presumed on the grant of a patent, and the patent is prima
rae evidence thereof. Waterbury Brass Co. v. N. K., ctc., Brass Co., 3
Fish. Pat. Cas. 43; lHuber ,. Nelson Mfg. Co., 3o Fed. 830. Whether a device
is new, however, depends upon whether it is the same kind as another or
whether it acts in the same way and produces the same result in substance.
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Howe Mack. Co. v. Nail Needle Co., x34 U. S. 388; Day v. Fair Haven Ry.
Co., 132 U. S. 98. To be raised to the dignity of an invention, the improire-
ment must be one which would not ordinarily occur to an expert mechanic.
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stove Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 493; Potts v. Creager, 155
U. S. 597. So also the aggregation or combination of old elements, which
perform no new function and accomplishes no new results, does not involve
a patentable novelty. Mosler Safe Co. v. Mosler, 127 U. S. 364; Peters v.
Hanson, 129 U. S. 541. Yet if such a new combination of known elements
produces a new and beneficial result, it is evidence of invention but not con-
clusive. Loom Co. v. Higgins, Io5 U. S. 58o. Moreover, the use of an old
thing for a new purpose does not constitute an invention unless it produces
a new and useful result. Grant v. Walter, 148 U. S. 547; Knapp v. Morss,
i5o V. S. 221. Nor is a device any less an equivalent of another because it
may perform an additfonal function, O'Leary v. Utica & M. V. Ry. Co., 144
Fed. 399; Wheeler v. Climper, Mower, etc., Co., Fed. Cas. No. 17,493. One
of the best tests of invention, also, is whether it brings to actual commer-
cial success what prior inventors had partly accomplished. Consolidated
Valve Co. v. Crosby Valve Co., 113 U. S. I57; Smith v. Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 686. And although prior unsuccessful experiments
involved the same idea or principle as a subsequent patent, the latter will not
be invalidated. Whitelys v. Swayne, 7 Wall. 685; Am. Bell Telep. Co. v. Peo-
ple Tel. Co., 25 Fed. 725.
SLAxDER-EVIDENCE-UNDERSTANDING OF WoRDs SpoEN.-PRocTER V.
POInTER, 56 S. . III (GA.).-Held, that in cases of slander, an exception is
sometimes made to the general rule that witnesses must state facts, and not
their inferences from them and as the slander and damage consist in the
apprehension of the hearers, they are allowed to give their understarnding of
the words spoken.
The general rule is that witnesses may state their understanding of
slanderous words proved to have been spoken. Tottlebein v. Blankenship,
88 Ill. App. 47; Freeman v. Sanderson, 123 Ind. 264. But a contrary view
has occasionally been taken. Snell v. Snow, 54 Mass. 278; Wright v. Paige,
36 Barb. (N. Y.) 438. So where a slander was made by insinuations and
gestures, it was competent for hearers to state what they understood by
them. Leonard v. Allen, 65 Mass. 24r. Custom may give to words an
uncommon meaning and a witness may be allowed to give his understanding
of them. Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57 Md. 38. But where words are unam-
biguous and expressed in ordinary language, a witness will not be allowed
to testify as to his understanding. Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 7zo. Hence,
the converse also is true, that evidence as to understanding of witness will
only be admitted where the words are ambiguous and susceptible of different
meanings. Shaw v. Shaw, 49 N. H. 533.
STATE REGULATION-POLIcE PowER-CrTY ORDINANcE-CITY OF SELMA
v. Tim, 42 So. 4o5 (ALA.).-Held, that a city ordinance, making it an offense
for one to peddle without having secured a license was not repugnant to the
Interstate Law nor any other feature of the State or Federal Constitution.
Any state has the right, by virtue of its police power, to tax or forbid
any class of employment which may be prejudicial to the public good
Cooley on Const. Limitations, sixth edition, 742; Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa.
St. 482. This police power is inherent in a state withoult any reservation in
the Constitution. Carthage -v. Frederick, x22 N. Y. 268; Corn. v. Vrooman,
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164 Pa. St 3o6. It must be distinguished from eminent domain or taxing
power. Carthage v. Rhodes, io Mo. I75; N. Y. Health Dept. v. Trinity
Church, i45 N. Y. 32. Although police power is exercised only for the pur-
pose of promoting the public welfare, yet the object must always be regula-
tion and not the raising of revenue. Walker v. Jameson, i4o Ind. 591;
Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Com'rs, 42 N. J. L. 364. M6reover, in the
absence of any constitutional restriction it may be delegated to the various
municipalities throughout the state. N. Y. Fire Dep't v. Gilmour, 149 N. Y.
453; Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375. But such city ordinance 
must not be a
regulation of interstate commerce nor discriminate between residents or
products of different states. Welton v. Mo. 9x U. S. 275; Robbins v. Shelby
Co. Taxing Dist. 12o U. S. 498. Hence, sellers by sample for future delivery
are not regarded, in this country, as peddlers, under such a city ordinance.
Stanford v. Fisher, 14o N. Y. 187; Com. v. Farnum, 114 Mass. 267. And one
imposing a license on peddling of patent rights would be unconstitutional
and void. In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. 836. So, also, such an ordinance must not
deny anyone, such as a foreigner, within the jurisdiction of that state, 
the
equal protection of its laws. State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192; County of
Santa Clara v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., iT8 U. S. 396.
STREET RAILROADS-CoLLISION WITH TEAM-EVIDENCE.-BAICKER 
V. PEO-
PIE'S ST. Ry. Co. op NANTICOKE & NEWPORT, 64 Am, 675 PA.-A col-
lision occurred between a street car and the plaintiff's wagon, the evidence
showing that if plaintiff had continued on his course, he could have cleared
the track and avoided the collision, but that having changed his mind, 
he
attempted to back off. Both the motorman and the plaintiff acted on the
belief that he would succeed. Held, that he could not recover for the injuries
received. Mestrezat, J., dissenting.
Persons engaged in operating street cars are not required to use more
than ordinary care to see that the track is clear to avoid collisions with vehi-
cles. St. Antonio St. Ry. Co. v. Mechler, 87 Tex. 628. Where a person
drives in front of an electric car and is struck by it, while attempting to get
off the track, the street railway is not liable where there was no evidence
that the speed was dangerous or that the gong was not sounded. Guilloz 
v.
Fort Wayne & B. L Ry. Co., io8 Mich. 41. The dissenting opinion is 
in
accordance with the decisions laid down in several jurisdictions. Since
street railroads have no superior right of way over vehicles at public 
cross-
ings, the company will be liable for negligence in its employees, in failing 
to
have the car under control at such places. Watson v. Minneapolis St. R. 
Co.,
53 Minn. 551; Hickman v. Union Depot R. Co., 47 Mo. 
App. 65. Although
the peril may have been increased by an attempt to avoid it, the street 
rail-
way is liable, if the driver was placed in peril by the negligence of the 
con-
ductor and injury occurred while the teamster was exercising ordinary 
care.
Gibbons v. Wilkesbarre & S. St. Ry. Co., 155 Pa. 279.
UsuRY-AssuMPTIoN OF UsuRious DF.BT.STUCKEY v. MIDDLE STATES
LOAN BLD;. & CONST. Co., 55 S. E. 996 (W. VA.).-Held, that one who pur-
chases land which is subject to an usurious debt and assumes 
payment of
such debt, as part of the consideration cannot be relieved from the 
usury.
Whether the right to take advantage of the different statutes of usury
is a personal or vested one is apparently a much mooted question in 
the vari-
ous jurisdictions of this country. Some courts give the assignee of 
an usuri-
ous trust obligation the smne rights of defense, as that of assignor 
at the
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time of the assignment Tamplin v. Wentworth, 99 Mass. 63; Woolfolk v.
Plant, 46 Ga. 422. These decisions are consistent with the general rule, that
an assignee takes an assignment subject to all the equities of the debtor exist-
ing at the time he received notice of the assignment Callanan v. Edwards,
32 N. Y. 483; Buckner v. Smith, i Wash. (Va.) 296. Courts maintaining
otherwise, hold that a person assuming payment of an usurious loan does so,
as part of the consideration, and that it is a personal right of the assignor,
and the assignee is precluded from setting up usury as a defense. Smith
v. McMillian, 46 W. Va. 577; Sands v. Church, 6 N. Y. 347. Improbably all
jurisdictions, an execution creditor and a purchaser of an equity of redemp-
tion are allowed to plead usury in the inception of the contract as a defense,
Bank v. Warehouse, 49 N. Y. 642.
